Forced compliance, misattribution and trivialization
Main Article Content
Simon, Greenberg, and Brehm (1995) found evidence of a new mode of dissonance reduction: trivialization. The purpose of this study was to show that trivialization can be used in misattribution situations to reduce dissonance after the execution of a counterattitudinal behavior. In the experiment reported here (2 x 2 design), participants had to write down arguments in favor of selective admission to the university. This task was carried out in high choice condition. Half of the participants were confronted with a source of misattribution (ultrasound waves) and half were not. Afterwards, the participants’ attitudes toward the issue and their extent of trivialization were measured. The collection order of these two measures was manipulated. As expected, with a source of misattribution, participants did not change their attitude, but trivialized. In addition, trivialization and attitude change were found to be alternative dissonance-reduction modes: when participants trivialized they did not change their attitude, and inversely, when they changed their attitude they did not trivialize.
According to Festinger (1957), the perception of an inconsistency among an individual’s cognitions produces a negative intrapersonal state labeled cognitive dissonance. This negative condition motivates the individual to reduce or to alleviate this aversive state. For instance, dissonance occurs when a person realizes a problematic behavior in high choice condition (forced compliance).
In order to reduce dissonance, he/she can change his/her attitude in the direction of the problematic behavior (attitude change: Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) or trivialize. Simon, Greenberg, and Brehm (1995) carried out the first experimental work on trivialization, a new mode of dissonance reduction. These authors showed that in induced compliance situations, participants could reduce dissonance by granting minimal importance to their compliant behavior or private attitude. Simon et al. examined attitude change and trivialization as two alternate modes for reducing dissonance. They manipulated the presentation order of the dependent variables (attitude first vs. trivialization first) and choice (high choice vs. low choice). The results showed that the high-choice participants used the first reduction mode made available. When trivialization was measured before attitude, participants trivialized but did not change their attitude. The inverse was also true: participants who reduced dissonance using the attitude-change mode no longer needed to trivialize. These results support exclusive switch model of alternate modes of dissonance reduction (e.g., Beauvois, Joule, & Brunetti, 1993; Götz-Marchand, Götz, & Irle, 1974).
From the beginning of his theory, Festinger (1957) posited that cognitive dissonance is an arousal state (see Elliot & Devine, 1994; Fazio & Cooper, 1983; Pallak & Pittman, 1972). Utilizing the attribution approach of Schachter and Singer (1962), Zanna and Cooper (1974) hypothesized that if dissonance was an arousal state and attitude change reduced it, then attitude change should not be observed after the attribution of arousal to a plausible external source. Zanna and Cooper (1974) showed that in dissonance condition participants who had ingested a pill said to induce tension changed attitude less compared with participants who had ingested a pill said to have a relaxing effect. This result has been replicated with another external source of misattribution and further attested that dissonance is an arousal state (Fazio & Cooper, 1983). It is worth mentioning that Fointiat (1998) showed that if participants in a misattribution situation did not change their attitude, they were found to use another mode of dissonance reduction, namely act rationalization (Beauvois & Joule, 1996, 1999; Beauvois, Joule, & Brunetti, 1993; Joule, 1996). Moreover, in misattribution situations attitude change can occur if counterattitudinal behavior is reintegrated (Higgins, Rhodewalt, & Zanna, 1979), or if participants come to question the appropriateness of the misattribution’s source (Wright, Rule, Ferguson, McGuire, & Wells, 1992). In sum, participants in misattribution situations experience cognitive dissonance. The aim of this study was to test trivialization in a misattribution situation. This testing has never been done before. It is hypothesized that another mode of dissonance reduction might be used in misattribution situations. More specifically, the present study was aimed at finding out whether the lack of an attitude change in a misattribution situation could be accompanied by trivialization of counterattitudinal behavior.
Method
Using a 2 × 2 design, participants were asked to write down arguments “in favor of selective admission to the university”1. All participants were free to agree or refuse to do so. The misattribution source was manipulated by making the participants believe that ultrasound waves were (ultrasound condition) or were not (no-ultrasound condition) being emitted in the experimentation room. In a postexperimental session, the participants’ attitudes about the issue in question and their extent of trivialization were collected. As was the case for Simon et al. (1995), the collection order was manipulated by measuring attitude either before (attitude-before-trivialization condition) or after (trivialization-before-attitude condition) trivialization. The experiment also had a control condition (not included in the design). Its purpose was to determine participants’ attitudes in a no-choice situation. The control participants also had to write down arguments in favor of selective admission, but they were not given the choice to accept or refuse.
We expected a classic dissonance effect in the forced compliance situation, in other words, a more favorable attitude toward selective admission in the no-ultrasound/attitude-first situation than in the control situation (preliminary hypothesis 1). We expected a classic misattribution effect, i.e., less attitude change in the ultrasound condition than in the no-ultrasound condition when attitude was measured before trivialization (preliminary hypothesis 2). We expected more trivialization in the ultrasound/attitude-first situation than in the no-ultrasound/attitude-first situation (main hypothesis 1). Finally, the attitude- change mode and the trivialization mode were expected to be alternatives (main hypothesis 2): in the no-ultrasound condition, attitude change but no trivialization was predicted when attitude was measured first, and inversely, trivialization but no attitude change when trivialization was measured first.
1 We conducted an independent pretest with 20 undergraduate students from the same university to measure their attitude towards selective admission to the university. They answered on a scale ranging from 1 (do not agree at all) to 9 (completely agree). The result of the pretest indicated that students were all opposed to selective admission to the university (M = 2.600, SD = 1.60).
Participants
The participants were 100 male and female undergraduate students at the University of Provence who were not majoring in psychology. Eighty were randomly assigned to four experimental situations and twenty were assigned to the control condition. Three participants had to be eliminated, two for refusing to carry out the counterattitudinal act (one in the no-ultrasound/attitude-first situation and one in the no-ultrasound/trivialization-before-attitude situation) and one for refusing to be exposed to the misattribution source in the ultrasound/trivialization-before-attitude situation. This left 19 participants in these three situations and 20 in the ultrasound/attitude-first situation.
Procedure
All participants had to write an essay in favor of selective admission to universities (counterattitudinal essay). Participants in the experimental groups, but not in the control group, were given the opportunity to agree or refuse to write the counterattitudinal essay. Half of participants were confronted with a source of misattribution (ultrasound waves) and half were not. The experimenter led the participants to believe that during the study, they would be subjected to ultrasound that could provoke an unpleasant state of tension in humans.
Measures
Two dependent variables were measured: attitude and trivialization.
Attitude The participants used a 9-point scale (1 = totally against, 9 = totally for) to rate themselves on the following item: “What is your personal opinion about selective admission to universities?”
Trivialization The participants used a 9-point scale (1 = not important at all, 9 = very important) to rate themselves on the following four items: “When you defend a position you disagree with, how important is it to you?” “For you, how important is the issue of selective admission to universities?” “If I asked you to write down arguments against selective admission to universities, how important would you say it was?” “How important do you feel your arguments in favor of selective admission to universities are?”
The order of appearance of the dependent variables was manipulated. The experimental participants were randomly assigned to the attitude-first condition or the trivialization-first condition. For the control participants, only attitude was measured.
Results
Attitude
An ANOVA was conducted on the experimental and control groups. It yielded a group effect, F(4,92) = 3.77, p < 0.01.
The expected dissonance effect was obtained: in the attitude-first condition participants without ultrasound (M = 4.36, SD = 1.92) had a more favorable attitude toward selective admission than participants in the control group (M = 2.65, SD = 1.72), Dunnett = 1.333, p < 0.05, d = 0.96 (preliminary hypothesis 1).2
The expected misattribution effect (preliminary hypothesis 2) was also obtained. Several comparisons confirmed this effect. In the attitude-first condition, participants allegedly subjected to ultrasound had a less favorable attitude toward selective admission (M = 2.35, SD = 2.15) than participants without ultrasound (M = 4.36, SD = 1.92), F(4,92) = 11.03 p < 0.01, d = 1.38. In this condition, the attitudes of participants subjected to ultrasound (M = 2.35, SD = 2.15) did not differ from those of participants in the control group (M = 2.65, SD = 1.72), Dunnett < 1.333, ns.
2 The cutoff values for Cohen’s d were .20 (small effect size), .50 (medium effect size), and .80 (large effect size).
Trivialization
The trivialization index was calculated by summing the ratings on the four trivialization scales. As in Simon et al. (1995), we conducted a principal component analysis on the four trivialization items. A Guttman effect was noted. Only the scores for factor 1 were highly correlated with the trivialization index (r = .997, p < 0.001). This index can therefore be said to reflect the hierarchical structure.
An ANOVA analysis of data indicated an interaction between ultrasound waves and measures, F(1,73) = 18.936, p < 0.01.
Our main hypothesis was validated: in attitude-first conditions, trivialization was significantly greater with ultrasound (M = 22.00, SD = 5.92) than without ultrasound (M = 29.21, SD = 3.98), F(1,73) = 16.322, p < 0.001, d = 1.46. The hypothesis of the alternate modes for reducing dissonance and the use of the first available mode was also validated. In the no-ultrasound condition, there was attitude change (M = 4.36, SD = 1.92) but no trivialization (M = 29.21, SD = 3.98) when attitude was measured first. Inversely, there was trivialization (M = 21.52, SD = 6.51) but no attitude change (M = 2.47, SD = 1.21) when trivialization was measured first. The difference between 4.36 (attitude measured first) and 2.47 (attitude measured last) was significant, F(1,92) = 9.48, p < 0.01, d = 1.21. The difference between 21.52 (trivialization measured first) and 29.21 (trivialization measured last) was also significant, F(1,73) = 16.322, p < 0.01, d = 1.46.
Discussion
In line with the results previously obtained by Simon et al. (1995), our own results show that participants placed in a standard situation of dissonance will use the first means of reducing dissonance made available to them. More specifically, if the measure of attitude is presented to them before the trivialization measures, they will change attitude. Conversely, they will trivialize if the trivialization measure is presented before the measure of attitude. This first result supports exclusive switch model of alternate modes of dissonance reduction (e.g., Beauvois et al., 1993; Götz-Marchand et al., 1974). In line with studies on false attribution in the arousal properties of dissonance (cf. especially, Zanna & Cooper, 1974), participants in conditions of false attribution do not modify their attitude whatever the order of the measures (i.e., attitude first versus trivialization first). We have claimed that in situations of misattribution, participants experienced cognitive dissonance since the change in attitude may appear.
Bearing in mind that participants could reduce their dissonance by way of act rationalization (Beauvois & Joule, 1996; Fointiat, 1998), we have tested another possible way of reducing dissonance in situations of false attribution: trivialization. In line with our expectations, participants placed in a situation of false attribution, rather than modifying their attitude, will use trivialization as a means of reducing dissonance.
To our knowledge, this is the first time a trivialization effect has been found with a source of misattribution. On the basis of these results, we can conclude that trivialization is in fact a possible mode of dissonance reduction in misattribution situations. These results are consistent with Fointiat’s (1998) study, where participants in a misattribution situation did not change their attitude, but were found to use another mode of dissonance reduction, namely, act rationalization (Beauvois & Joule, 1996, 1999; Beauvois et al., 1993; Joule, 1996). Our results together with Fointiat’s thus show that a dissonance-reduction process can take place in a misattribution situation. The fact that this process can be observed is incompatible with certain interpretations of the absence of attitude change in misattribution situations, especially those contending that such situations do not arouse dissonance in participants (e.g., Cooper & Mackie, 1983; Croyle, 1985; Pittman, 1975; Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997) or that misattribution reduces the dissonance temporarily (Drachman & Worchel, 1976).
Future studies should enable us to understand why, in misattribution situations, participants reduce their dissonance by means of trivialization or act rationalization, but not attitude change.
Beauvois, J. L., & Joule, R. V. (1996). A radical dissonance theory. London: Taylor & Francis.
Beauvois, J. L., & Joule, R. V. (1999). A radical point of view on dissonance theory. In E. Harmond-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 43-70). Washington, DC: American Psychology Association.
Beauvois, J. L., Joule, R. V., & Brunetti, F. (1993). Cognitive rationalization and act rationalization in an escalation of commitment. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 14, 1-17.
Cooper, J., & Mackie, D. (1983). Cognitive dissonance in an intergroup context. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 536-544.
Croyle, R. T. (1985). Cognitive dissonance and misattribution: A psychological examination. Dissertation Abstracts International, 45(12-B, Pt 1), 3993.
Drachman, D., & Worchel, S. (1976). Misattribution of arousal as a means of dissonance reduction. Sociometry, 39, 53-59.
Elliot, A. J., & Devine, P. G. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance as psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 382-394.
Fazio, R., & Cooper, J. (1983). Arousal in the dissonance process. In J. Cacioppo & R. Petty (Eds.), Social psychophysiology: A sourcebook (pp. 122-152). New York: Guilford Press.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, UK: Row Pertson.
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequence of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 58, 203-210.
Fointiat, V. (1998). Rationalization in act and problematic behaviour justification. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 471-474.
Götz-Marchand, B., Götz, J., & Irle, M. (1974). Preference of dissonance reduction modes as a function of their order, familiarity and reversibility. European Journal of Social Psychology, 4, 201-228.
Higgins, E. T., Rhodewalt, F., & Zanna, M. (1979). Dissonance motivation: Its nature, persistence, and reinstatement. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15(1), 16-34.
Joule, R. V. (1996). Une nouvelle voie de réduction de la dissonance: La rationalisation en acte. In J. L. Beauvois, R. V. Joule, & J. M. Monteil (Eds.), Perspectives cognitives et conduites sociales (pp. 293-307). Neuchâtel et Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé.
Pallak, M., & Pittman, T. (1972). General motivational effects of dissonance arousal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 349-358.
Pittman, T. (1975). Attribution of arousal as a mediator in dissonance reduction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11, 53-63.
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state. Psychological Review, 69, 379-399.
Simon, L., Greenberg, J., & Brehm, J. (1995). Trivialization: The forgotten mode of dissonance reduction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 247-260.
Stone, J., Wiegand, A. W., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997). When exemplification fails: Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 54-65.
Wright, E. F., Rule, B. G., Ferguson, T. F., McGuire, G. R., & Wells, G. L. (1992). Misattribution of dissonance and behaviour-consistent attitude change. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 24, 456-464.
Zanna, M. F., & Cooper, J. (1974). Dissonance and the pill: An attribution approach to studying the arousal properties of dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 703-709.
Appreciation is due to reviewers including
Robert Watson
PhD
School of Social Sciences and Humanities
University of Ballarat
P.O. Box 663
University Drive
Mt Helen
Ballarat
VIC 3353
Australia
Robert Vincent Joule, Université de Provence, 29 Avenue Robert Schuman, F-13621 Aix en Provence, France. Phone: +33 (0) 44 295 3812; Fax: +33 (0) 44 220 5905; Email: [email protected]