Definitions

Culture There are hundreds of definitions of culture (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952) but a useful definition is that culture is to society what memory is to individuals (Kluckhohn, 1954). It includes what has worked in the experience of a society, so that it was worth transmitting to future generations. There is also some consensus (Borofsky, Barth, Shweder, Rodseth, & Stolzenberg, 2001) about the usefulness of Redfield’s (1941, mentioned in Borofsky et al.) definition of culture as shared understandings made manifest in act and artifact. A related view is that culture is the theory that members of a society have about what members of the society consider the “code being followed, the game being played” (Keesing, 1974, p. 89). This view is similar to the recent development of the view that culture is based on perceived consensus (Zou et al., 2009).

Elements of culture are shared standard operating procedures, unstated assumptions, meanings, practices, tools, myths, religions, art, kinship, norms, values, and habits about sampling information in the environment. Dawkins (1989) called the elements of culture memes. They could include a word, tune, idea, clothes, fashions, ways of making pots, and so on. The essence of a meme is that it is a replicating entity. Cultural evolution involves the transmission of memes from generation to generation.

Self-deception Triandis (2009b) argues that self-deception occurs because humans use their hopes, needs, and desires to “construct” the way they see the world. Self-deception can be found in a wide range of everyday phenomena. God is an excellent example of self-deception. What would be more consistent with our hopes, needs, and desires than to have an omnipotent entity support our battles, whether they are to grow better crops, to reach health and happiness, or to eliminate our enemies? Examination of the gods around the world (Triandis, 2009b) indicates that in most cultures gods help people reach their goals. Also, by praying people reduce perceived uncertainty and their anxieties caused by terrorism, physical or economic calamities, crime, and other factors.

Furthermore, in the case of many religions, the beliefs are extremely complimentary to the adherents. In some religions believers become God-like by participation in that religion (e.g., Mormons become “Latter-day Saints”). In many religions people believe that they are guaranteed eternal life in paradise. Perhaps the clearest case of self-deception is provided by Shinto, because it is a Japanese folk religion that is less sophisticated than the universal religions of Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism that have adherents in many countries (Holton, 1946) so it does not include the public relations facets of those other religions. Shinto beliefs include the virtue of the emperor, that the armies of Japan will always be victorious, that Japan is a sacred land inhabited by a peerless nation of people, innately endowed by the gods with unique psychological qualities. Shinto beliefs are based on the conviction of a great national destiny, the duty to spread the glory of Japan throughout the world, and thereby save the world from injustice and wrong (Holton, 1946, pp. 151-152).

The reality that humans are the product of evolutionary processes is contrary to the self-concepts of most humans, who think of themselves in much more complimentary terms. There is also evidence that humans see the world according to information that comes from both the outside and inside (emotions, expectations, theories, ideology, prejudices, and so on). For example, when a wild animal is attacking, the focus of the prey is completely on that animal; but when there is no time pressure a person might see the world entirely on the basis of what is inside. For example, there are people who believe that President Barack Obama is not an American. There is research (Devine, 1989) that shows that most white Americans experience a vague negative emotion when they see the stimulus “black man”. However, most of them control this emotion, so they act in a nonracist way. A neurologist (Burton, 2008) has described what happens when our reptilian brain emits a negative emotion that is controlled by our cortex. In some cases the emotion controls perception, so the individual has what Burton calls a delusional misidentification. The individual then perceives only on the basis of what is inside, not on the basis of reality.

Self-deceptions occur because humans are unable to process all the information available in their environment. For example, the eyes of a human being are capable of discriminating 7,500,000 colors, but individuals can process only a few (seven or so according to Miller, 1956) independent pieces of information. Thus, it is necessary that individuals sample information, and they tend to prefer sampling pleasant rather than unpleasant – or anxiety-producing – information (references to the empirical literature on this point can be found in Triandis, 2009b). Seeing the world according to their hopes, needs, and desires is very pleasant.

Cognitive simplicity-complexity There is a tendency for self-deceptions to be cognitively simple. For example, who created the world? The discussion of this question in astrophysics, exobiology, paleontology, evolutionary theory, and so on is complex. Sagan (1980) used more than 100 pages, and Hawkins and Mlodinow (2005) used a whole book to explain how we moved from the big bang to homo sapiens. It is so much simpler to say: “God”.

People who are cognitively simple tend to place heterogeneous entities into the same category (e.g., by calling these countries the “axis of evil” President George Bush placed Iran, Iraq, and North Korean in the same category; the Taliban killed members of Doctors without Borders because they saw all foreigners as enemies). Cognitively simple people use only one dimension to discriminate entities (e.g., us versus them), and even when they use more than one dimension they see the dimensions as very highly correlated. By contrast, cognitively complex individuals (Triandis, 2009b) use a large number of categories to perceive a domain, use many dimensions to discriminate the entities in that domain, and perceive these dimensions as correlated in complex ways (e.g., the more of this the less of that, depending on the value of a third variable). Complex individuals tend to avoid extremist positions.

Variations Among Cultures

There are myriad ways to distinguish one culture from another culture. Some of the most important are:

Simple (e.g., hunters and gatherers) versus complex (e.g., information societies) cultures (Chick, 1997). Complex societies, such as Roman, the Western Chou, Egyptian, Minoan, Mycenean, Mayan, and the like, are characterized by specialization of occupations, stratification, and sociopolitical control (Tainter, 1988). The importance of this dimension, which also contrasts rural with urban samples, is that in simple cultures there are more people who are cognitively simple. In some studies (see, for example, Harvey, Hunt, & Schroeder, 1961), more than half the college students in the United States of America have been considered cognitively simple.

Tight (many rules of behavior, and deviation from norms is punished severely) versus loose (few rules, and deviation is tolerated) cultures (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Pelto, 1968; Triandis, 1994). The importance of this dimension is demonstrated in that much of Islam is “tighter” than the looser Western cultures (Triandis, 2009b), so that particular attention to this difference may be required for Islamic and Western cultures to be able to get along.

Collectivist (the self is an aspect of some collective) versus individualist (the self is independent of in-groups) cultures (Triandis, 1995). This dimension contrasts people in most of the world with the West. However, as we will see below, there are demographic factors that make some samples in collectivist cultures individualist, and some samples in individualist cultures collectivist.

Vertical (hierarchical) versus horizontal (egalitarian) cultures (Triandis, 1995). The ecological determinants of these dimensions are discussed in Triandis (2009a). Some of these dimensions of cultural variation are correlated at about .4, but since that correlation is low the dimensions should be considered distinct. Specifically, there are minor correlations between simple cultures, tightness, collectivism, and vertical cultures (e.g., Carpenter, 2000), as well as between complexity, looseness, individualism, and horizontal cultures.

Collectivist cultures can be horizontal (HC; for example, the Israeli kibbutz) or vertical (VC; for example, an Indian village); individualist cultures can be horizontal (HI; for example Sweden or Australia) or vertical (VI; for example, American academia, large corporations). In horizontal cultures individuals do not want to “stand out” and be noticed. In vertical cultures some individuals focus on being “the best, famous, unusual, unique”.

In HC the essence is that all participate equally in all activities of the culture, and decisions are taken by consensus. In VC the essence is conformity to authorities (Bond & Smith, 1996). In HI cultures people do their own thing, but are more or less equal, and avoid standing out. In VI cultures, where competition is an important element, it is acceptable for individuals to focus on being the best.

When studying such dimensions it is important to pay attention first to the domain, be it social relations, politics, economics, philosophies, aesthetics, or religion. For example, a culture could be collectivist in one domain and individualist in another domain. Mao’s China was collectivist in most domains but in the 21st century China is individualist in economics and aesthetics. Second, one must consider demographic factors. Specifically, age, gender, social class, education, amount of contact with other cultures, and exposure to the modern mass media can change the position of a sample on any of these dimensions of cultural variation. For example, lower class samples in many cultures are more collectivist than upper class samples in all cultures (Kohn, Naoi, Schoenbach, Schooler, & Slomczynski, 1990), so that an upper class sample from a collectivist culture might be more individualist than a lower class sample from an individualist culture.

Collectivism and individualism are opposites when data are collected across cultures (Hofstede, 1980). However, when the data are collected from individuals sometimes these two attributes can be orthogonal to each other (Gelfand, Triandis, & Chan, 1996). For that reason Triandis, Leung, Villareal, and Clack (1985) introduced the terms allocentric and idiocentric as personality variables corresponding to collectivism and individualism. There are allocentrics and idiocentrics in every culture, but there are more allocentrics in collectivist and more idiocentrics in individualist cultures. Adjustment of individuals to a culture depends on the fit of culture and personality. Allocentrics are best adjusted in collectivist cultures, and idiocentrics in individualist cultures. Allocentrics in individualist cultures are likely to join communes, unions, associations, committees, and the like. Idiocentrics in collectivist cultures find conformity to the norms of the in-group too confining and seek to move to an individualist culture. For example, East Germans who moved to West Germany before 1989 were well adjusted and successful if they were idiocentric but did not adjust well if they were allocentric (Schmidt, 1994).

Researchers have identified numerous attributes in samples located on high versus low positions of the above-mentioned dimensions of cultural variation (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007). A summary of the findings can be found in Triandis and Gelfand (in press).

Variations in Self-Deception (from Triandis, 2009B)

Numerous examples of self-deception can be found in accounts of historical events. When the French revolution started on July 14, 1789, with the storming of the Bastille, Louis XVI wrote in his diary only one word: “Rien [Nothing]”. It seems strange that such an important event would be dismissed as unimportant, but it was consistent with the king’s hopes. Had he avoided this self-deception he might have saved his neck from the guillotine.

Philip II (1527-1598) of Spain, was a champion self-deceiver. The Encyclopedia Britannica (1957, Vol. 17, p. 722) says of him: “No experience of the failure of his policy could shake his belief in its essential excellence”.

In the Manifesto of 93 German Intellectuals (1914) it was stated that it was not true that German soldiers trespassed into neutral Belgium, it was not true that German soldiers killed Belgian civilians, and it was not true that German soldiers willingly burned the library of the University of Louvain. All three events happened. But how could these intellectual giants who included Nobel Prize winner Max Planck, and Wilhelm Wundt, who started psychology as a laboratory science in 1879, know what their soldiers were doing? Obviously, they did not have direct evidence. They used their hopes, needs, and desires to form their beliefs. In short, even intellectual giants sometime deceive themselves.

Even from physics there are examples of self-deception. In the last years of the 19th century, after the Germans had discovered X-rays, a French physicist by the name of Blendot, reported that he had discovered N-rays. Given the French-German rivalry at that time, this was consistent with the hopes, needs, and desires of the French. Thus, Blendot received many honors, and his salary was tripled. When an American physicist sent a paper to the most highly regarded French physics journal reporting that he could not replicate Blendot’s work, the journal rejected the paper. That is another attribute of self-deception: We tend to favor positive information and to reject negative information. In an article published in The Economist research carried out by Elaine Fox of the University of Exeter is described. Fox believes the tendency to prefer positive and neglect negative information is in the genes (“A gene for optimism”, 2009). Thus tendencies toward frequent self-deceptions may also have a genetic component.

Park (2001) presents scores of examples, starting in the 1840s, of how, when a major invention was announced the media frequently proclaimed that it was “the most important discovery of all times”. Often such inventions and reports involved energy, so that “you can have abundant electricity at no cost, forever”. Cold fusion was one of those “breakthroughs” in which both the State of Utah and the U.S. Federal Government invested generously. A number of companies, including a subsidiary of Toyota have invested in the development of some of these dreams, because their managers did not know or did not understand the second law of thermodynamics. What could be more consistent with the public’s hopes, needs, and desires than to have cars that are 100% efficient?

Self-deceptions associated with religion are especially important. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause (2001) used single proton emission computerized tomography to determine what parts of the brain are activated when people behave in various ways. They reported that during meditation, yoga, and deep praying, as well as when running, dancing, and during sexual intercourse, the delineating becomes blurred between parts of the brain that are activated when the sense of “self” is experienced and when the sense of “not self” is experienced. Thus, the individual has the sense of the self being in contact with infinity. That phenomenon is probably responsible also for what happens during spiritual experiences – when the self appreciates supreme excellence. Thus, a beautiful landscape, a wonderful painting or ballet, or listening to great music like Bach or Beethoven, can produce the same effect, where the individual feels that s/he has “gone to heaven”. Newberg and colleagues argue that rhythm in general can produce ecstasy, and the fact that this phenomenon is experienced during many activities such as dancing and sexual intercourse is an indication that its source is an evolutionary process.

In previous research (Triandis, 2009b) I distinguished between external religions in which adherents assume that there are supernatural entities, and internal religions, such as original Buddhism in which followers of the faith do not make this assumption and confine all religious action to internal events, such as reaching nirvana. I have promoted (Triandis, 2009b) the belief that external religions are self-deceptions, and that, unfortunately, they have been, and are, associated with much violence.

Polytheism was a tolerant religion because there was always room for one more god. Gibbon (1776/1963) makes the point that the Roman Empire provided one of the longest periods in human history when people did not fight each other because of differences in religion. He also made the much-quoted statement: “The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people, as equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false; and by the magistrate, as equally useful” (p. 43). By contrast, for monotheists one – and only one – god can be worshiped. In Islam, one of the five pillars of the religion is that no other gods can be worshiped. This may result in the beliefs that “I am right” and “You are totally wrong”.

Harris (2005) points out that religion is currently the cause of violence all around the world, – Palestine (Jews vs. Muslims), the Balkans (Orthodox Serbians vs. Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbians vs. Bosnian and Albanian Muslims), Northern Ireland (Protestant vs. Catholics), Kashmir (Muslims vs. Hindus), Sudan (Muslims vs. Christians and animists), Nigeria (Muslims vs. Christians), Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan (Shiah vs. Sunni), Southern Thailand (Buddhists vs. Muslims) and so on. Every day, violent events traceable to religion are reported in the news. I have argued (Triandis, 2009b) that the human race is stranded on a small planet as a result of evolutionary processes (random variation and selective retention), in an infinite universe, and the best chance of survival is for all humans to feel compassion and love for all humans. This is a “religious” view that is very different from the views that generate violence. I have argued that the purpose of life for every individual is to help as many humans as possible to be (a) healthy (both physically and mentally), and (b) happy, so they can (c) live a long time, (d) without destroying the environment. Violence undermines all four criteria. In short, some of our self-deceptions have lethal consequences.

Some Correlates of Self-Deceptions

There is a tendency for self-deceptions to be linked to megalomania. For example, Rokeach (1964) found in one mental hospital three individuals who believed that they were Christ. Osama Bin Laden believes that the whole world will become Islamic and he will be the Caliph.

Cognitive simplicity is found in many self-deceptions. People who are cognitively complex are likely to be aware of their self-deceptions and control them. It has been shown in research that cognitively complex people are less prejudiced, less authoritarian, and less extremely conservative politically (Jost, 2006). A testable hypothesis is that violence occurs more frequently among people who have many cognitively simple self-deceptions than among those who control their self-deceptions and who are cognitively complex.

Self-Deceptions and Mental Health

Moderate self-deceptions are associated with good mental health (Taylor, 1989). People who have no self-deceptions are often depressed (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). Excessive self-deceptions are found among patients in mental hospitals (Rokeach, 1964), but also among politicians, highly religious people, and terrorists (Triandis, 2009b). I have stressed the advantages of the principle of “nothing in excess”, to be used for all dimensions of cultural variations. In other words, moderate amounts of simplicity, complexity, tightness, looseness, collectivism, individualism, horizontality, and verticality are preferable to the extremes of these attributes.

Relationships between Culture and Self-Deception

People in collectivist cultures have self-deceptions of the “my in-group is wonderful” type; people from individualist cultures have self-deceptions of the “I am wonderful” type. For example, in a survey of one million American high school seniors it was found that 70% thought they were above average in leadership ability compared to other high school students, and only 2% thought that they were below average. In terms of the ability to get along with others, 100% of these students thought they were above average (Gilovich, 1991, p. 77). Statistically, only 50% can be above average. The Japanese appear more modest, more realistic, and may deceive themselves less than do Americans. But Kurman (2003) found that this difference occurs because the norm in Japan is to present oneself as more modest than is the case in the United States. Specifically, while Americans tend to have a very good opinion of themselves, Japanese tend to be self-critical (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). On the other hand, many Japanese, as pointed out earlier, have a very high opinion of Japan as a nation (Holton, 1946).

People from simple, tight, or vertical cultures are likely to deceive themselves more frequently than do people from complex, loose, or horizontal cultures. An important hypothesis is that people in cultures where their religious beliefs are extremely important to them tend to be higher in self-deception than do people in cultures that are less religious. For example, a poll of samples from various countries found that the rejection of Darwin’s theory of evolution is found among about 20% of Scandinavians, about 35% of Central Europeans, about 45% of Americans (USA), 60% of Turks, and 92% of Egyptians (The Economist, 2009).

Conclusion

Further research will uncover many links between culture and self-deception. In order to determine that a belief is a self-deception it is necessary to establish what “reality” is, which is not always apparent. But beliefs associated with historical events lend themselves to examination better than most beliefs, because after the fact there is evidence of whether a person’s belief did or did not correspond to reality. The attributes of the culture of that individual can then be examined. By collecting data about the position of individuals on the dimensions of cultural variation it can be determined if people who frequently deceive themselves are found most often in cultures located on the high or low side of each dimension of cultural variation. This kind of information is useful in predicting the actions of people from another culture. If people are high in self-deception we can expect that they will have unrealistic perceptions of the way the world is. For example, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad of Iran said that there are no homosexuals in Iran, that the holocaust never happened, and that Israel will disappear from the face of the earth. All three beliefs are obviously consistent with his hopes, needs, and desires and I have pointed out that these beliefs are clearly self-deceptions (Triandis, 2009b). In dealings with the President of Iran in the future those involved can predict, from these beliefs, that he will be seeing the world in ways that conform to these three beliefs and that, therefore, differ substantially from the way most of us in the USA see the world.

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The author wishes to thank Jeff Bryson for useful comments on a previous version of this paper.

Dr. Harry Triandis, Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana, Psychology Building, 603 E. Daniel Street, Champaign, IL 61820, USA. Phone: 217 344 6722; Fax: 217 244 5876; Email: [email protected]