A test of two theories in the initial process stage of coalition formation

John Flaherty1, Sidney J. Arenson1
1Syracuse University, United States
Cite this article:  Flaherty, J., & Arenson, S. J. (1978). A test of two theories in the initial process stage of coalition formation. Social Behavior and Personality: An international journal, 6(1), 141-146.

Volume 6 Issue 1 | e209 | Published: February 1978 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.1978.6.1.141

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Males and females participated in a coalition formation procedure by interacting with a computer program that simulated a pachisi game situation. All players occupied position A in the triad, where A > B > C and A < (B + C). The female partner preference data supported a weighted probability model of coalition formation over a bargaining theory. The male partner preference data did not support either theory. Females tended to prefer player B and present a lower initial bargaining demand than males. Three of the six factors of the Shure and Meeker personality and attitude schedule which were related to players' initial bargaining demands were authoritarian nationalism, suspiciousness, and risk avoidance. Males and females differed significantly on these same three Shure and Meeker factors.
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